Negotiations on National Security Risks: The Case of Us-Soviet Relations (2023)

1The more sophisticated and destructive the weaponry that was introduced into the arsenals of United States (USA) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) during the Cold War years, the closer both sides came – advertently or inadvertently – to the brink of hot war. Too many arms meant too high the risk of a showdown, even one that was unwanted. Both superpowers began subscribing to this maxim somewhere around the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. Since then it has been an important component of their strategic relationship and of the theory and practice of deterrence (George and Smoke 1974). It was also an integral part of the negotiations agenda when strategic dialog finally opened between the superpowers in the early 1970s.

2Of particular importance in this respect is the fact that, individually and together, both sides singled out the problem of “risk” in their mutual relations during the Cold War and, what is more, agreed to undertake a joint effort to control it. Irrespective of the ideological struggle and political rivalry, mutual survival was one of the first things on which they agreed (Center for Strategic and International Studies 1985). Apparently, both agreed that risk control was much more important and achievable in these circumstances than even a short-time advantage in nuclear or missile technology. The episode involving the neutron bomb can be mentioned as an example: the whole idea of developing a new and smart weapon was dismissed in the early 1980s because it threatened the evolution of the mainstream negotiations on risk reduction.

3In a way, this provides an additional insight into the specifics of risk negotiations. In risk negotiations, if the solution to a problem under negotiation is part of the wider picture or a bigger strategy, then something resembling a shift in values occurs. Risk, because of its importance, overshadows other elements of the policy, just as being diagnosed with a serious disease overshadows one’s long-term life plans. And this – the importance of risk – influences prenegotiations, the process of negotiations itself, and the outcome of the negotiations.

4The identification of the risk is an unavoidable part of the negotiation and naturally extends into risk assessment and risk evaluation. This is because for a proper negotiation to take place, there needs to be not only a general agreement that a “risk” exists, but also an estimation of its magnitude, of its possible development, and of the conditions under which it could become either activated or reduced. These do not guarantee that the negotiation process will be less difficult or less desirable. But, bearing in mind the differences between potential actors in terms of capabilities, ways of thinking, positions, and traditions, it is easy to imagine just how difficult negotiating a “risk” actually is. What makes negotiating a “risk” especially difficult is that the sides involved are mainly concerned with the practical aspects of risk: first and foremost, the extent to which a risk may challenge their individual or collective ability to foresee a given development and to plan for a given contingency. Neither side wishes to negotiate the theoretical magnitude of a risk, and this makes it difficult to identify the potential threat that a risk may present.

5No less difficult is the other part of negotiation on risk control: its purpose. The ideal solution is to eliminate the risk completely. However, the negotiator is not always able to do this, nor is it completely in his/her interest if some asymmetry exists in risk identification and risk assessment. Therefore, as the first step at this stage of the negotiation, it is both logical and perceptive to hold an exchange of views regarding a program of action (what to do once the risk is identified, evaluated, and agreed upon). The negotiators, without necessarily revealing all their fears and hidden agendas, establish the extent of their differences, the purpose being to eliminate the risk, to limit it, or to establish a procedure that would permit the parties to start consultations once a risk occurs. The last of these options is similar to US-SOVIET agreements on the prevention of inadvertent nuclear war, of incidents on and over the high seas, and of authorized missile launches. Initially, none of these cases led to the establishment of standing mechanisms to deal with the risks. Instead, procedures were established that would be implemented once a risk of that type appeared.

6Study of international negotiations has permitted researchers to conclude that there is a certain link between the type of the issues negotiated and the type of solutions suggested (Kremenyuk 2002). In the case of risk negotiation, especially given the complexity of the subject and the difficulties associated with risk identification, there also seem to be some typical solutions: bilateral and multilateral actions and mechanisms: commitments that may help either to reduce the probability of risk or bring it under control if it occurs.

7One possible area of negotiation on risk management is risk reduction: that is, taking measures to reduce either the scale or the probability of a risk. In this case the negotiation is about measures that may be helpful; however, the threat – being perceived as something that cannot be changed but must just be lived with – is not discussed as such. This is like people living close to a volcano who know it may erupt one day, yet cannot do anything about it.

8Another possible aim of negotiation on risk management is risk avoidance or risk prevention. Not all experts agree that these concepts are identical; however, they are in reality very close in meaning and may be regarded, especially by practitioners, as identical. Moreover, both come into the category of management and thus depend heavily on human decisions.

9Risk negotiations between the USSR and USA acquired two interrelated values. One value was risk reduction itself. Each side was at odds with the other and planning for a nuclear war. Both had worked hard to develop new types of weapons and the means to deploy them. Both continued to emphasize their psychological and ideological preparedness for such a contingency. At the same time, both understood the high risk of such a strategy in terms of risking “letting the genie out of the bottle” every time they introduced a new type of military technology. Thus, in parallel with what was sought officially (a strategy of containment), there was growing unofficial concern about the rising probability of risk.

10A second value was that once a negotiation on risk reduction had started (with, first of all, negotiations on risk identification), it could not but lead toward a deeper and greater appreciation that the policy as a whole needed to be changed if risks were to be reduced to any great extent. The somewhat naive expectations of the first years after the Cuban Missile Crisis, namely, that the policy of confrontation could have continued in tandem with attempts to reduce the risk of unwanted developments soon changed when it was understood that, without a profound transformation in the policy itself, all efforts to contain risk or to manage it in some other way would be pointless.

11It is thus legitimate to say that, at the beginning, the whole US-SOVIET risk reduction exercise was seen as a means both of making the process of military confrontation much more manageable and of freeing it from unforeseen or unexpected intrusions by risk from different sources. At that time, at least, it seemed that not only national security but also the process of confrontation had to be defended from risks. Only with time has it become evident that risks in US-SOVIET relations were not simply the result of neglect or human error but inherent in the type of relationship that existed between them, with its military confrontation, ideological hostility, and political rivalry. To reduce the risk in these relations, an effort to change their very substance was needed. But this understanding came much later, in the late 1980s.

12This double side to risk management negotiation in US-SOVIET relations has added an unexpected and unusual dimension to the negotiations process. Instead of marginalizing risks and turning them into a less visible part of the strategic relationship, it has focused the attention of the public and of governments on the risk issue and brought it to the very heart of a heated debate. For example, the motion picture, The Day After (1983), played a tremendous role in mobilizing public opinion against various early plans of the Reagan administration (“Star Wars,” the neutron bomb, and the like).

13As part of the process of understanding the US-SOVIET negotiations on security risk reduction, it is important to remember that there was no sensible theoretical scheme or blueprint for solving this problem, at least at the very beginning. Although the attitude of both sides toward the issues of military confrontation was extremely responsible and, as a rule, was given top priority by the policymakers, there was almost no (or very little) attempt to work out a sensible strategy on risk control and reduction. The usual approach was of an ad hoc nature: deal with the problem considered urgent at the time, then forget about it once an agreement is reached.

14Thus, the first sensible attempt to reduce the risk of a crisis through reliable communication was born of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas followed in 1971 and the Agreement on the Prevention of the Risk of Nuclear War, covering arrangements on confidence-building measures, accidental or unauthorized launches, and so on, was concluded in 1973. There is a strong impression given that subjects for negotiation were occasionally (or even accidentally) picked out of the host of problems existing between the two nations and then, depending on the situation, negotiated and solved fairly quickly. The more comprehensive or sophisticated approach to the problem of risk reduction and risk aversion between the two superpowers appeared only in the 1980s as a result of progress in their mutual relations and the introduction of unilateral and bilateral management procedures that allowed security risks to be reduced to an acceptable and tolerable level.

15It is important to mention these developments in order to explain the processes through which issues for US-SOVIET negotiations on risk reduction and management were identified. In other cases studied in this volume, risk identification is/was a regular part of the management process; in US-SOVIET security relations, the problem of risk reduction arose only when there was the possibility of a human or technical error (which the military and security establishments were reluctant to admit) or when there was a realistic prospect of the confrontation being mismanaged. Through such instances, the need to reduce risks and to find ways to manage them became a solid ground for mutual relations in general and for prompt negotiations in particular.

16From among dozens of negotiations and agreements concluded between the Soviet Union and the USA in the years of the Cold War on the subject of security and arms control, it is sufficient, for the purposes of this study, to select the following cases: 1) the negotiations on the Hotline Agreement (1963) and the follow-up Agreement to wwww. nuclearfiles. org/ menu/ library/ treaties/ usa-ussr/ trty_us-ussr_agreement-communications_1971-09-30.htm (1971); 2)the negotiations on the wwww. nuclearfiles. org/ menu/ library/ treaties/ usa-ussr/ trty_us-ussr_agreement-risk_1971-09-30.htm (1971); 3)negotiations on the Agreement on Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas (1972); 4) negotiations and conclusion of the Agreement between the Soviet Union and the USA on the Prevention of Nuclear War (1973).

17Chronologically, the period during which these negotiations were carried out can be described as the one when the relations between the superpowers were moving from the total and absolute confrontation of the 1950s, crowned by the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, to the period of 1980s, when the most meaningful achievements took place that finally led to the end of the Cold War. The thing to be reckoned with is the essence of these negotiations and agreements: establishment and improvement of communications; joint identification of sources of risk; discussion of measures and procedures to contain risk and to reduce it to acceptable levels; growth of trust; and, finally, transition to threat reduction measures (arms control and establishment of direct military and security cooperation).

18The literature on the subject of the US-SOVIET security negotiations is not that large. In that group there was a unique study undertaken by A. George at Stanford University that inspired many new ideas among researchers both in the USA and the Soviet Union. George’s first monograph, published in 1983, was entitled Managing US–Soviet Rivalry: Problems of Crisis Prevention (George 1983). Another important publication was US-SOVIET Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons, published in 1988 and edited by George et al. (1988). This book deserves the highest praise for several reasons. It was written on an appropriate subject and at an appropriate time, when there was an urgent need to draw lessons from the experience of the early 1980s on security cooperation between the superpowers.

19The period of a “new world order” (pronounced a year later by the then U.S. President George Bush Sr.) was fast approaching, and it was understandable that for the stability of the future order to be realized, it would have to be built upon security cooperation between the two military giants. George et al. (1988) also studied in depth the various issues of security cooperation between the superpowers: arms control and arms reduction, resolution of regional and local conflicts, non-proliferation, and the mechanisms of joint decision making, such as negotiation, consultations, and parallel unilateral steps.

20The agreement on the establishment of direct communication between Moscow and Washington (the Hotline Agreement) was negotiated at ambassadorial level in early 1963 and signed in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding on 30 June in the same year. As already mentioned, the idea of negotiation and agreement regarding direct communication was already in the air, prompted by the common understanding that the process of confrontation contained too many risks. There needed to be a mechanism whereby the leaders of both superpowers could communicate at times of crisis or when they needed prompt, first-hand information (Blechman 1985).

21It is legitimate to suggest that the whole hotline idea came directly out of talks between the leaders, was found relevant, and approved – only later to be relegated to the working level for formalization as an intergovernmental agreement. Because of the specificity of security risk management, this is not an infrequent occurrence. Very often, in the past and present, the most confidential and urgent issues – and risk control can be included in this category – are negotiated directly between decision makers, or in the media, or in both; only subsequently do they then become the subject of official negotiations. Alternatively, an issue may be solved without any negotiation at all, simply via an exchange of unilateral commitments. As an example may be cited the destruction of tactical nuclear weapons in the late 1980s, when the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and his American counterpart, George Bush Sr. exchanged unilateral commitments after agreeing in the course of an informal negotiation process to destroy their weapons.

22Thus, although the negotiation on the hotline was of a visibly technical nature, its major political significance was evident and widely recognized. At the same time – and this needs particular mention – this negotiation was regarded by both sides as a corollary of the Cuban Missile Crisis and an ongoing part of the negotiation on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (prohibition of nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in space, and under water), which was signed on 10 October 1963.

23The Partial Test Ban Treaty is mentioned simply as a reminder that the end of the Cuban Missile Crisis created a window of opportunity in the relations between the superpowers that helped start a series of negotiations between them leading to: 1) recognition of risk and measures to reduce it; b) recognition of common interests, including a slowing of the arms race, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the introduction of rules of conduct for the superpowers. Thus, the negotiation on risk reduction, though important, was only one of several items on the agenda between the Soviet Union and the USA (Ury and Smoke 1984).

24Once negotiated and agreed upon, the risk reduction agreement, namely, the Hotline Agreement, took on a life and momentum of its own. The need to improve and further implement the Agreement prompted the next negotiation in 1970–1971. It was considered necessary to continue the negotiations because of the developments in communications technology at the time, and in mid-1971 this was fulfilled at the ambassadorial level. On 30 September 1971 a new agreement was signed which added two channels of direct satellite communication between the two capitals (telex and voice communication) in order to increase the reliability of the channels established by the 1963 Agreement.

25In parallel with the 1971 negotiations to improve direct communication, there was another negotiation that ended in agreement on 30 September of that year; this was devoted to measures to reduce the risk of inadvertent nuclear war (Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War). As is typical of such negotiations, there were almost no political issues or overtones, with the two sides negotiating both organizational and technical measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of their respective nuclear weapons. The following items were agreed:

  • A pledge by each party to take measures each considers necessary to maintain and improve its organizational and technical safeguards against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
  • Arrangements for immediate notification should a risk of nuclear war arise from such incidents, from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems, or from any accidental, unauthorized, or other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon; and
  • Advance notification of any planned missile launches beyond the territory of the launching party and in the direction of the other party (Nuclearfiles.org).
What typified this negotiation was the unusual combination of two aspects. The first aspect was the attention given to the negotiation by the top echelons of power who exercised almost daily control over the negotiation process. This close control made the process both easier and more difficult at the same time. It facilitated the process because the second aspect – the participation in the negotiations of large groups of military and technical experts – caused a major problem of coordination on each side of the table (Dobrynin 1995). However, this did provide an opportunity for negotiators to meet leaders of the governments on a regular basis and opened the way to a smoother handling of the differences between the individuals and agencies involved in the negotiation.

26At the same time, however, the interference of policymakers made the negotiation more difficult in the sense of creating problems regarding the final text of the agreement. It is always hard to explain all the aspects of an agreement before agreeing the final wording; the balance of gains and losses is not particularly evident. This is why untimely interference by a decision maker causes problems, in the same way that a hungry diner, by poking his nose into the kitchen, holds up the cooking process.

27In any negotiation on such delicate issues as risk management there is always a certain formality in the way it is conducted. The process has to be carried out almost in private, without unnecessary interference either by the media or by legislators (who as public figures will unavoidably draw publicity to the process). This does not mean that the executive arm of government will allow the process to develop uncontrolled. But being able to discuss issues that are sensitive (from the security point of view) in an atmosphere of growing trust and cohesion creates close and even friendly relations among the negotiators. And it is in this context that interference by the executive can become destructive for the process.

28The Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the High Seas was negotiated during two sessions: one in October 1971 and the other in May 1972, at the time of U.S. President Nixon’s (1969–1974) visit to Moscow. By that time, the problem of incidents on and over the high seas had acquired importance because of two developments. The first, the advancement of the “Blue Water Strategy” by the U.S. navy to expand its operations across the world’s oceans made addressing the possibility of incidents at sea more urgent. Equally, the introduction of “Gorshkov’s Strategy” into the activities of the Soviet navy brought the same result. Named after the then commander-in-chief of the Soviet navy, Admiral S. Gorshkov, the strategy significantly stepped up Soviet naval activities in the ocean with the aim of shadowing the U.S. navy and protecting Soviet supply lines.

29Another aspect of the same problem was the desire to codify in some way the acts of each side in relation to their ships and aircraft (the detention of the U.S.S. “Pueblo” by North Korea in 1968 shows the significance of this). A totally new development, however, was President Nixon’s strategy of negotiating with both the USSR and China to channel their rivalry in a much more constructive direction. In this sense, the negotiation on incidents at and over the high seas seemed both highly relevant and quite easy to achieve.

30The negotiation was completed and the agreement signed on 25 May 1972. Among the major discussions at the negotiation were security provisions covering the movement of: 1) the ships and naval units of both sides on the high seas, and 2) any craft in flight over the high seas, according to the standards and norms of international law. The sides also discussed mutual obligations to prevent actions by their ships and aircraft that could lead to a danger to the ships and aircraft of the other side. Within this format they also negotiated consultation procedures and mechanisms for use in case of accidents. This negotiation had a dual purpose: to oblige the military on both sides to work together in the event of accidents (following reports that some Soviet submarines had not received adequate U.S. assistance following an incident) and to avoid an escalation of these incidents into larger clashes.

31Finally, on 22 June 1973 a treaty was negotiated and signed in Washington on the prevention of a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the USA. The negotiation was based on the assumption that both sides were equally interested in preventing nuclear war and any other use of nuclear weapons. From that starting point, they pledged not to take any action that might lead to a dangerous aggravation of tensions; they also promised to avoid military confrontations and not to let anyone, including their own side, unleash a nuclear war.

32In the event of the possibility of nuclear war threatening relations between the superpowers, both sides agreed to issue commitments to start mutual consultations with a view to avoiding a conflict. The process of negotiation was quite smooth and even-handed. It touched on issues that were of mutual concern, given that both sides were almost equally interested in keeping their own arsenals and the activities of their military under control. In this sense the negotiated agreement was regarded by both sides as an additional means of using national and non-national observation facilities to control what was happening inside the strategic arsenals. From this point of view, negotiations on strategic risk management had a definite function in terms of being an auxiliary means of improving national management capacities through international cooperation. As a result, there was always an opposition, sometimes open, sometimes hidden, in all these talks.

33To some extent, the negotiation on the reduction of the threat of inadvertent nuclear war had a declaratory, almost propagandistic, nature. This was emphasized by the fact that the Soviets wanted to sign it during the visit of the Communist Party Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev, to the USA in June 1973, when it was expected to have a great impact on American public opinion. This set certain time constraints which helped negotiators skip over unimportant details. Also highly important in this negotiation were: 1) the adherence of both sides jointly to the goal of prevention of nuclear war; 2) their readiness to declare that position for the knowledge of other nuclear powers (particularly China) and; 3) agreement by both that the achievement of this goal was within their capabilities. Even more importantly, behind these aspects there was a shared understanding of the nature of crisis escalation and of ways of controlling it. Overall, this made the problem of negotiation easier and non-confrontational.

34As all these negotiations were classified as “national security,” complete information on them is still unavailable. There are memoirs in which different episodes of these negotiations are described (Kissinger 1979; Dobrynin 1995). There is literature which uses some of the declassified materials (see George 1983; George et al. 1988). But there is still not enough information available to build a detailed reliable picture of the whole process of negotiations. What follows is a legitimate attempt to reconstruct some of the important features of these talks as they were conducted. Almost all the talks were carried out in close communication with other negotiations aimed at threat reduction. Though negotiations on risk reduction were, as a rule, an independent undertaking, they were still – by their very nature part of a larger process. While trying to reduce the overall threat from the other side, both superpowers were interested in reducing the “risk” part of that threat.

35As soon as both superpowers agreed that they had a common interest in avoiding nuclear war, their thinking underwent a two-way split: one the one hand, there was a focus on how to avoid a nuclear war through a sustained long-term effort to reduce arms ceilings, ensure much greater transparency of military doctrines, and fulfill mutual obligations; on the other hand, there were efforts to take immediate urgent measures that could significantly reduce the probability of risk prior to dismissing it completely at some later stage. That is why negotiation on risk reduction was always a part of a larger security effort – albeit a rather independent part with its own raison d’être.

36The second feature of these negotiations was, of course, their closed nature and the almost complete media blackout surrounding them. It was not that the participants had ideological reasons for not wishing to demonstrate the actual degree of their cooperation. Quite the opposite: once the agreement was signed, the negotiations were a propaganda showcase for each side. But during the negotiation, as long as an agreement was not signed, both sides preferred not to make public any information about it; they considered that a failure to find a compromise could become a political risk itself – in other words, failure could easily provoke a crisis.

37Third, each time a negotiation on risk reduction took place, it was conducted within a short and fruitful period. There are several hypotheses regarding this: the parallel and highly similar way of thinking on both sides; the fact that the type of tools and mechanisms put forward by each side were logical and thus easily predictable; that the decision makers quite sensibly placed the negotiators under pressure; and the visible role of the professional culture (both sides were usually represented by professionals who had very similar views on the subject).

38Fourth, each negotiation may be regarded as a highly technical, almost non-political undertaking. While at other similar security negotiations a political element was dominant and had a visible imprint on the whole process and outcome of the negotiation, the talks on risk reduction were intentionally stripped of any political and ideological component and made purely technical: the best possible outcome was identification of risk, finding an effective method of communication and, as the ultimate goal – as the very minimum of any conflict – avoidance of a larger conflict.

39Fifth, almost all the agreements that followed had no time limits. They were not linked to any broader conditions; they were regarded as values in themselves.

40A negotiation on security risk control may happen for one of two main reasons. One reason may be that risk, by its very nature and because it cannot be fully controlled, presents a challenge to both (or more) actors. In this case, irrespective of the general state of relations (good, bad, extremely bad, etc.), the superpowers had a definite interest in making their relationship more stable and predictable by conducting some sort of risk control negotiation. Among the cases of negotiations mentioned above, the best example would be the agreement on the prevention of incidents at and over the high seas: this helped to institute a regime within which the naval rivalry between the superpowers could be regulated at the lowest possible risk of a confrontation that might evolve into a major crisis.

41The second reason is the complete opposite. It may be that there are signs of fatigue with the confrontation and that the idea of some sort of accommodation becomes popular; this forces both sides to begin a joint action to initiate control over expected (and unexpected) risks. This occurs because such risks would challenge their ability to keep the situation under control. Among the cases mentioned above, the negotiation on the agreement on prevention of nuclear war of 1973 may be mentioned.

42However, both sources indicate that there is quite a high level of proximity or cohesion between the superpowers in terms of their basic security interests. Although there was in the 1950s a period when the idea of using strategic “uncertainty” to intimidate the other side (the “strategic bluff”) was popular, in reality neither of the superpowers was prepared to act under conditions of ambiguity, as such actions would be fraught with serious risks to their national security. Sober analysis has brought a firm conviction that the interests of a “controlled” confrontation – not to mention the interests of international stability – are best served by a successful negotiation on risk control,

43The second major conclusion that may be drawn as a result of an analysis of negotiations on risk control is that the actual subject of these negotiations is very limited. Unlike threat reduction negotiations, which are concentrated on such matters as arms control and reduction, confidence building, security cooperation and so forth, negotiations on risk reduction are usually limited to two things: 1) communication, including the exchange of verifiable data on sources of possible risk; and 2)procedures prescribing the mode of action of each side should a risk appear that might develop into a security crisis. When limited only to such tasks, therefore, negotiations on risk control never take too long to complete. However, such negotiations do not relate to risk prevention issues because the goal of preventing a risk usually comes at some stage during the development of mutual trust and confidence.

44The third important feature of negotiations on risk is that they are usually treated as highly “technical” because of the inherent nature of their tasks. Political issues, the most sensitive and controversial aspects of the relationship, are not touched upon at all, or are approached in a very delicate manner. Negotiators assigned to such delicate missions are not usually instructed, or even supposed, to raise controversial issues (it is not part of their mandate to do so). Instead, they concentrate on highly specific, technical questions that are quite easy to negotiate. Extremely important, however, is that the results of such negotiations and even the fact that such negotiations take place, have a high political significance.

45Finally, negotiations on risk control have a significantly broader importance and value than ordinary, more concrete negotiations because they stabilize the relationship in a certain direction, namely, toward higher predictability and toward the shared value of avoiding unwanted confrontation. A negotiation on risk control either accompanies negotiations on broader issues of threat reduction or precedes them as an overture toward some more fruitful stage. There is no doubt that risk control negotiations in the area of security area may, and do, have a value of their own in the sense that they form part of the policy of smoothing out any rivalry and making a situation more risk-free. It is also important, however, to see that the real significance of risk negotiations in the security area lies in the fact that they frequently achieved far more than they were originally intended to.

  • [*]

    This is a shortened version of the chapter. The full version will be published in the monograph “Negotiations on Risk” published by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (Austria) under the guidance of R. Avenhaus and G. Sjostedt

  • [**]

    E-mail: vkremenyuk@ yahoo. com

  • [1]

    Résumé proposé sous la responsabilité de la revue et n’engageant pas l’auteur.

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